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NEW YORK'S SENTENCING AND PAROLE
LAW: AN UNANTICIPATED AND
UNACCEPTABLE DISTORTION OF THE
PAROLE BOARDS' DISCRETION
EDWARD R. HAMMOCK* AND JAMES F. SEELANDT**

The fourth year of Governor George E. Pataki's tenure has
been witness to some dramatic changes in the criminal justice
process. 1 Sweeping reformations sponsored by Governor Pataki
include the restructuring of sentencing guidelines, 2 and the
sharp curtailing of parole eligibility. 3 While the criteria for pa4
role eligibility have not been changed by legislative enactment,
an examination of the current release practices 5 of the Board of
* B.A. Brooklyn College 1959; J.D. St. John's University School of Law 1966. Edward
R. Hammock, the former Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole, is currently
in private practice in New York and specializes in post conviction advocacy.
** B.A. Marist 1990; M.P.S. State University of New York, New Paltz 1993. Mr.
Seelandt is a Client Advocate with The Bronx Defenders with a specialization in appellate practice. He has lectured at New York Law School on the subject of New York's sentencing and parole laws.
1 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1995, ch. 3 (1995) [hereinafter Act] (requiring determinate sentences for all violent felons or non-violent felons who are subsequently convicted of violent felony heightened standards for applying "good-time" credit to determinate sentences); see also COLo.REv.STAT. § 18-1-105 to -107 (Bradford 1997) (providing
specific fines and sentences for five classes of felonies); MO.ANN.STAT. § 558.016 (Vernon
1979) (allowing heightened sentences for repeat offenders and providing maximum sentence for all felonies); TENN.CODE.ANN. § 40-35-101 to -35-112 (Michie 1997) (stating uniformity in sentencing as its purpose ).
2 See Act, supra note 1, at 108-10 (providing that all violent felonies are to have a
court fixed minimum sentence).
3 See Act, supra note 1, at 114-15 (providing that person serving one or more determinate sentence is ineligible for discretionary release or parole).
4 See Frederic Pierce, Families Vow to End Parole for Violent Felons/Rally Puts a
Name and a Face to Proposed Legislation, POST STANDARD (Syracuse), Nov. 25, 1997, at
Al (noting Governor Pataki's resolution eliminating parole for first-time violent felons
was defeated 73-71); Pataki, Silver Spoon Squabble Over Parole Reform, TIMES UNION
(Alb.), June 27, 1997, at B2 (noting partisan conflict over Governor Pataki's paroleending legislation). But see John Caher, Slaying Case Spurs Calls for Parole Reform,
TIMES UNION (Alb.), Feb. 11, 1998, at B2 (noting that in wake of violent murder of nursing school student by paroled violent felon, "[tihen Democratic Assembly members who
last year opposed a Republic measure have signed on to their own version").
5 See Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Limitations on Parole and its Possible Consequences, 1996
No.13 N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS 1 (stating that "in the last few years the [New York State] Pa-
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Parole 6 ("the Board") reveals that the current parole system has
been at the forefront of an ideological revolution. 7 Increasingly,
this has meant the exclusion of entire classes of otherwise eligible offenders from being granted release into parole supervision,
in direct contravention of various provisions of the Executive
Law8 and a long line of Appellate Division decisions. 9
Despite the foregoing, the Board has also been subject to intense public scrutiny and criticism 10 due to expressed concerns
that the parole process it oversees may actually be facilitating
hardened ex-offenders' regression into a life of crime and violence upon their release. 11 As a direct result, one of the Board's
major tactics has been the withholding of discretionary release
role Board seems to have adopted a more stringent policy regarding early release on parole" because in 1987 Parole Board granted parole to 60% of persons having homicide
convictions who came before it, compared to 25% in 1994 and 4% in 1995).
6 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW 259-b[l] (McKinney 1993). The New York State Board of Parole is a statutorily created review board comprised of not more than 19 members appointed by the Governor confirmed by the Senate and shall serve a term of six years. Id.
Each board member is required to have an undergraduate degree plus at least five years
professional experience in the one or more fields of criminology, administration of criminal justice, law enforcement, sociology, law, social work, corrections, psychology, psychiatry or medicine. Id. at b[2]. The Board is charged with compiling and maintaining detailed records on each inmate received and every inmate released on parole. Id.; see also
N.Y. ExEc. LAW 259-a[1]-[2]. Moreover, the Board is responsible for prompt determination upon receipt of inmate, of such person's minimum period of imprisonment, parole
eligibility and revocation of parole and conditional release. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i[1]-[3].
7 See, e.g., Alan J. Chaset, Something Old Something New, 5 SPG CRIM. JUST. 11, 39
(1990) (discussing changes in US sentencing commission guidelines); Peter B. Hoffman,
History of the Federal Parole 1910 - 1972, 61 FED. PROBATION 23, 23 (1997) (discussing
ideological changes in parole requirements); Michael Fisher, Changing Pennsylvania's
Sentencing Philosophy Through the Evolution of Parolefor Violent Offenders, 5 WIDENER
J.PUB.L. 269, 272 (1996) (discussing changes and effects in parole requirements).
8 See Tsimbinos, supra note 5, at *1. While first time violent offenders may still be
eligible for parole under indeterminate sentences effected before Oct. 1, 1995, they are
currently being denied parole more and more at the discretion of the Parole Board. Id. at
*1.

9 See Matter of King v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 250 (1st
Dep't 1993) (finding that Parole Board's denial of parole application of individual convicted of felony murder where inmate had served 22 years and had demonstrated "extraordinary rehabilitative achievements" was abuse of discretion because Board had
premised its decision "on a fundamental misunderstanding of its role and power, and was
not in accord with statutory requirements").
10 See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1012
(1991) (noting demise of rehabilitation philosophy in criminal justice system over last two
decades).

11 See Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by
ParoleBoards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 579 (1994) (noting that criticism of Parole Board discretion focuses on arbitrariness of decisions rendered and failure to cure recidivism). See
generally Robert Blecker, Heaven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1154 (1990) (comparing and contrasting
validity of rehabilitation and retribution through daily experiences in rural Virginia
prison).
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for certain classes of offenders. 12 Moreover, inherent in the operation of New York's parole system is a difficult dilemma: How
to best balance the requirements of individual freedom, justice
and public safety?
The approach taken by the New York State Board of Parole in
addressing this dilemma and striking a potential balance is the
subject of this study. Upon closer scrutiny of the parole process,
however, it becomes abundantly clear that the Board itself from
time to time deviates from the Legislature's intent 13 and sometimes even acts outside the scope of the Executive Law.
Parole (i.e. discretionary release) involves hard decisions for
high stakes. In this regard, the criminal defense bar is witnessing a dramatic shift towards a more punitive approach toward
convicted offenders. 14 Accordingly, by way of this article, the
Correctional Relations Committee of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers seeks to examine this trend
more closely, particularly as it relates to discretionary release
upon parole.

12 See Palacios, supra note 11, at 578 (discussing parole release guidelines to structure court's discretion); Louis B. Schwartz, Options in ConstructingA Sentencing System:
Sentencing Guidelines Under Legislative or JudicialHegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 65962 (1981) (noting court's wide discretion in imposing conditions on parole and in revoking
parole).
13 See Julio A. Thompson, Note, A Board Does Not A Bench Make: Denying Quasi
JudicialImmunity to ParoleBoard Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 241, 258-65 (1988) (discussing problems in parole board system, including lack of
thoroughness among the board members and limited checks on authority, which problems have lead to Board overreaching beyond their limits and violating Constitutional
rights of both prisoners and other citizens); see also Michael J. Shehab, Michigan Criminal Sentencing-It is within the discretion of the trial judge to sentence a defendant to
three times the recommended guidelines. It is also within the discretion of the trialjudge
to remove a defendant from the jurisdiction of the parole board: People v. Merriweather,
73 U. DET. MERCY L.REV. 653, 662 (1996) (discussing legislative efforts to limit scope of
Board's power).
14 See Gray Cavender & Michael C. Musheno, The Adoption and Implementation of
Determinate-BasedSanctioningPolicies: A Critical Perspective, 17 GA. L. REV. 425, 426
(1983) (stating that adoption of determinate sentencing in response to perceptions that
indeterminate sentencing has resulted in abuse of discretion and disparate sentences is
more than reform of sentencing structure because it also "entails a rejection of rehabilitation in favor of other justifications for the criminal sanction"). See generally Rivera
Live: Guests Discuss Needed Reforms in the Parole System (NBC television broadcast,
Dec. 15, 1995), available in 1995 WL 13491970 (comparing California's decision to revoke
parole for all violent offenders and increase spending for prison construction with Governor Pataki's attempt to pass same type of legislation in context of current shift of penal
philosophies from positive to negative reinforcement).
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PAROLE RELEASE LAW IN NEW YORK STATE

The Board performs a very significant function in determining the length of time that an inmate will spend in prison.
Further, it is entitled by law to exercise substantial discretion
within this sphere.15 The Board's "discretion," however, does not
provide unlimited insular protection by any means. Rather, the
statute requires that the decision to release a detainee must be
premised upon more than "good behavior." 16 Several other important criteria are required for consideration: public welfare
considerations and the potential for criminal recidivism, 17 the
inmate's overall institutional record, interpersonal relationships
15 See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 259-h(5) (McKinney 1993). The discretion of the Parole
Board is far-reaching. See generally N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c[1]-[3], [6], [9], [11] (McKinney 1993). Respectively, these sections provide in relevant part:
The state board of parole shall:
1. have the power and duty of determining which inmates serving an indeterminate
or a reformatory sentence of imprisonment may be released on parole and when and
under what conditions;
2. have the power and duty of determining the conditions of release of the person
who may be conditionally released under an indeterminate period of reformatory
sentence of imprisonment;
3. determine, as such inmate is received by the department of correctional services,
the need for further investigation of the background of such inmate and cause such
investigation as may be necessary to be made as soon as practicable ....
6. have the power to revoke the parole or conditional release of any person and to
authorize the issuance of a warrant for the retaking of such persons ....
9. for the purpose of any investigation in the performance of duties made by it or
any member thereof, have the power to issue subpoenas, to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documents pertinent to the
subject of its inquiry.
11. make rules for the conduct of its work, a copy of such rules and of any amendments thereto to be filed by the chairman with the secretary of state.
Id.; see also Newcomb v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 452 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (3d Dep't
1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1176, 1176 (1982) (stating that State Board of Parole is
vested with broad discretion in determination of parole applications); Canales v. Hammock, 431 N.Y.S.2d 787, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (stating that Parole Board is given sole discretionary power to review prisoner's eligibility for release).
16 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i[2](c) (McKinney Supp. 1997). Section 259-i[2](c) provides in pertinent part:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct
or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law, and that his release is not so deprecate to the seriousness of
his crime as to undermine respect for law.
Id.
17 See Thomas C. Kowalski, The United States Parole Commission: A Profile to Fill
the Knowledge Gap, 39 FED B. NEWS & J 440, 441-42 (1992) (discussing Board guidelines
for decisions as including review of likelihood of recidivism); Travis & O'Leary, A History
of Parole, in PROBATION, PAROLE AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 112-19 (3d ed. 1984)
(noting exercise of Board's discretionary power evaluates rehabilitative effect of parole).

1999]

NEW YORK'S SENTENCING AND PAROLE LAW

with the staff and fellow inmates, 18 and statements by victims
before the Board. 19 Moreover, the statute requires such additional factors to be weighed as the seriousness of the offense, 20
the type and length of sentence, and prior criminal record. 21 Up
until 1978, the procedure was that the Board itself set the minimum terms for over 70% of the offenders committed to prison. 22
Today, statute requires the sentencing court to set the minimum
period of imprisonment. 23 Reminiscent of this pre-1978 practice,
currently, the Board once more institutes its own brand of sentencing policy. 24 This is done under the guise of exercising its
18 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW 5 259-i(5) (McKinney 1982). The guidelines for making the
parole decision are listed in 8 259 -i(2)(c) of that statute and include (i) the institutional
record, including program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work accomplishments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates. Id.
19 See Jennifer S. Bales, Equal Protection and the Use of Protest Letters in Parole
Proceedings: A ParticularDilemma ForBattered Women Inmates, 27 SETON HALL L. REV.
33, 55 (1996) (discussing Texas parole procedures which take into account victim statements when deciding to grant or to deny parole); Thompson, supra note 13, at 266 (acknowledging victim statements as relevant in directing parole decisions).
20 See, e.g., Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (1st Dep't
1997) (stating that where sentencing court, rather than Board of Parole has set minimum sentence of imprisonment, Board must consider seriousness of offense and inmate's
previous criminal history).
21 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i[1](a)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1993). Section 259-i[1](a)(i)-(ii)
applies to all persons "received in an institution under the jurisdiction of the department
of correctional services with an indeterminate sentence, and the court has not fixed a
minimum period of imprisonment." Id. Within 120 days of such person's arrival, he/she
shall be brought before the Board to determine "the minimum period of imprisonment to
be served prior to parole consideration in accordance with the guidelines." Id. The guidelines shall include: (i) The seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of
sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating or aggravating factors, and, activities following arrest and
prior to confinement; (ii) prior criminal record including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustments to any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional
confinement.... Id.
22 See Pamela L. Griset, Discretion, Disparity, and Discrimination in Sentencing:
Where Have All the Critics Gone?, 35 No. 3 JUDGE'S J. 3, 3 (1996) (noting that "national
consensus on discretionary sentencing crumbled during 1970's"); see also Garcia v. New
York Dir. of Parole, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (1st Dep't 1997) (stating that where sentencing court rather than Board of Parole has set minimum sentence of imprisonment, Board
must consider seriousness of offense and inmate's prior criminal record).
23 See People v. Demers, 482 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (3d Dep't 1984) (noting that sentence
for criminal action is wholly within discretion of court); People v. Stampler, 454 N.Y.S.2d
411, 412 (Nassau County Ct. 1982) (stating that purpose of having period of imprisonment determined by court rather than by parole board based on belief that judge would
be more responsive to community involved than parole board). See generally N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1993) (requiring sentencing court to impose sentence within
minimum and maximum periods).
24 See Tsimbinos, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that "in the last few years the [New
York State] Parole Board [not the legislature] seems to have adopted a more stringent
policy regarding early release on parole" because in 1987 Parole Board granted parole to
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discretion as to whether or not to release the inmate to parole
supervision or to hold him beyond the minimum term. 25 In this
regard, Executive Law § 259-i (c)(1)denotes the statutory guidelines that may legally premise a denial of parole. 26
Another problem has been that New York courts have simply
refused to question the decisions of the Parole Board in the latter's exercise of discretionary power to grant or refuse parole
unless the petitioner can conclusively prove that the Board has
failed to comply with statutory factors. 27 Moreover, in many deserving cases, the Board simply fails to fully consider an inmate
otherwise eligible for release. 28 This abdication of the Board's
legislatively imposed mandate impacts negatively on the criminal justice process as a whole and thwarts the implementation of
the parole guidelines in that process. 29 In this regard, judges
need to appreciate the fact that the discretion of the Parole
Board has probably become too broad. 30 Further aggravating a
60% of persons with homicide convictions, compared to 25% in 1994 and 4% in 1995).
25 See, e.g., Waters v. New York State Division of Parole, 676 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (3d
Dep't 1998) (affirming denial of parole despite inmates earned eligibility); Walker v.
Travis, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1st Dep't 1998) (affirming denial of parole based solely on
severity of past crime); Nieves v. New York State Division of Parole, 675 N.Y.S.2d 158,
159 (3d Dep't 1998) (affirming denial of parole despite inmate having obtained certificate
of earned eligibility).
26 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i[2](c) (McKinney 1993). The statute requires that "[discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or
efficient performance of duties while confined, but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, [1] he will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law, and that [21 his release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society and [3] will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for the law." Id.
27 See Matter of Bouknight v. Russi, 661 N.Y.S.2d 989, 989 (2d Dep't 1997) (stating
that where Parole Board complies with statutory requirements, "discretionary denial of
parole is not subject to judicial review"); Delman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 461
N.Y.S.2d 403,406 (2d Dep't 1983) (noting that "[d]iscretion of the [Parole Board] in matters of parole release decisions is not judicially reviewable if made in accordance with
statutory requirements").
28 See, e.g., Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 415 (1st Dep't
1997). Despite a prisoner's impressive accomplishments in prison, it was held that the
Parole Board's denial of parole was not arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 418. People ex rel.
Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881,881 (1st Dep't 1983). The Parole Board's denial of parole was affirmed where an inmate, who was convicted of first
degree manslaughter and had participated in several rehabilitative programs while in
prison, earned her high school equivalency, held positions of responsibility, completed 21
college credits and had applied and was accepted to Baruch College. Id. at 882.
29 See Erin Ann O'Hara, Parole, 78 GEO. L.J. 1329, 1336-39 (1990) (discussing due
process considerations in state parole decisions); see also Stuart G. Friedman, The Michigan Parole Board: A Smoldering Volcano, 77 MICH. B.J. 184, 184-85 (1998) (opining that
parole board is irresponsible in freeing dangerous criminals back into society).
30 See Tsimbinos, supra note 5, at 1-2. It has been argued that Governor Pataki's
proposed legislation is not well-thought out in that there have been no public hearings, or
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propensity to abuse an already overly broad discretion, the
Board is not required to cite each factor it relies on as a predicate for release denial, nor need it give each factor equal
weight. 3 1 Given this awkward state of affairs, it is therefore difficult for those challenging the Board's decisions to prove that it
actually abused its discretion, let alone for these claimants to
prevail on such claims upon review. 3 2 To make matters worse,
courts in this state remain reluctant to second-guess a decision
33
of the Board denying parole release.
Unquestionably, in each case that comes before it, the Board
has a legal duty to give fair consideration to each of the applicable statutory factors for release enumerated in the Executive
Law. 34 When the record of the Parole hearing fails to convincingly demonstrate that the Board considered all of these factors,
denial of release becomes arbitrary and capricious. 3 5 Accordingly,
any examination of other jurisdictions' experiences (e.g. California). Id. at 2-3. This oversight will likely result in courts being unduly overburdened with litigation stemming
from this proposed legislation. Id. at 2; see also State Judges Question Further Limitations on Parole, N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS, May 1996, at 13. The state supreme court judges
were reported to be highly critical of Governor Pataki's end to parole for violent offenders, insofar as it was felt their exclusively judicial role had been usurped by New York's
chief executive. Id. at 1.
31 See Matter of Farid v. Travis, 657 N.Y.S.2d 221, 221-22 (3d Dep't 1997) (stating
that Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor considered); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 468 N.Y.S.2d
881, 884 (1st Dep't 1983) (noting that "[t]here is no requirement in the law that the board
place equal or greater emphasis on petitioner's present commendable conduct that on the
gravity of her offense"); People ex rel. Haderxhanji v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 467
N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1st Dep't 1983) (stating that required "factors were discussed with
petitioner at the hearing, and although not mentioned in its decision, the board is presumed to have considered them"); Matter of Friedman v. Hammock, 438 N.Y.S.2d 628,
629 (3d Dep't 1981) (holding that "since there is no requirement that the 'due consideration' to be given each factor set forth in the statute [N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i] be detailed
in writing, .. . it must be presumed, in the absence of any convincing showing to the contrary, that the board fulfilled its duty under the statutory mandate and did not consider
them").
32 See, e.g., Herbert, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 882-84. The court affirmed the Parole Board's
denial of the parole of an inmate convicted of manslaughter but who had effectively selfeducated and proven herself "rehabilitated." Id.
33 See Vasquez v. New York Bd. of Parole, 658 N.Y.S.2d 538, 538 (3d Dep't 1997)
(stating that Parole Board's denial of parole application is discretionary and will not be
disturbed by reviewing court as long as decision satisfies statutory requirements); see
also Saunders v. Travis, 656 N.Y.S.2d 404,404 (3d Dep't 1997) (noting denial of parole
application is discretionary, yet demands satisfaction of specific factors); Herbert, 468
N.Y.S.2d at 884 (stating that "[uinless there has been a showing that respondent's determination was so irrational as to border on impropriety, judicial intervention is not
warranted").
34 See Qafa v. Hammock, 438 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (1981). The asserted purpose of section
259-i is to require that statutory criteria applicable to the individual inmate are considered by Board in reaching its decision as to a minimum period of incarceration. Id. at 41.
35 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW §259-i[2](a) (McKinney 1997) (mandating that where Board
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the Board should be required to demonstrate, in its decision and
on the record, that it has duly considered the requirements of the
statute. Currently, California, Texas, and Florida have such a
procedure in place. 36 Blanket denials that merely restate the
elements of the offense and label it "serious," currently in vogue
in New York, reflect that the Board's decision-making process is
not in accord with the statutory framework of the requirements
set forth in the Executive Law. 37
INTERPRETING THE PAROLE STATUTE

There is no absolute constitutional right to parole in this or
any other state. 38 However, the Board is guided by statutory
schemes in making its release decisions. 39 As indicated above,
under Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c), denial of parole must be reasonably predicated on one or more of three identified standards. 40 These standards include: 1) whether, if released, the
inmate will live and remain at liberty without violating the
does not grant parole, it must give reasons for denial "in detail and not in conclusory
terms"); see also Harris v. New York State Div. of Parole, 628 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (3d Dep't
1995) (holding Board's denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious where Board refused
to consider sentencing court's recommendation); Telefarro v. Hammock, 84 A.D.2d 790,
791 (2d Dep't 1981) (holding Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious). But see
People ex rel. Long v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 401 N.Y.S.2d 701, 701-02 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977) (finding Board's determination was not arbitrary or capricious as parole denial
was based on seriousness of crime).
36 See CA. PENAL LAW § 3041(a) (West 1997). The Board of Prison Terms establishes
criteria to determine parole release, considering "factors in mitigation or aggravation of
the crime." Id.; FL. ST. § 947.16(2)(h) (West 1997). The Commission determines parole
release date based on relevant information in inmate's record file. TX. GOVT. § 508.156(b)
(West 1997). The Panel reviews inmate's records to determine parole.
37 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i[2](a) (McKinney 1997). The Parole Board seems to disregard its statutory obligation to provide a detailed account of the reasons behind its determination. Id. at 3.
38 See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 259-i[21(a) (McKinney 1997). Determination of release to
parole is made by the Board, in accordance with statutory guidelines. Id.; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 2-7 (1979).
"[R]easonable entitlement to due process is not created merely because a State provides
for possibility of parole" and there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before expiration of sentence. Id. at 2; Newcomb v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 452 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (3d Dep't 1982). New York law provides for no constitutional right to parole and Board has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or
deny parole. Id. at 914; Matter of Russo v. Board of Parole, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984 (1980).
"Any rightful liberty interest held by accused is extinguished upon his conviction, thereby
precluding any inherent constitutional right to parole." Id.
39 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-c[4], -i[2](a) (McKinney 1997). The Board determines
parole in accordance with guidelines established and required by law. Id.
40 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i[2](c) (McKinney 1997). The Board cannot grant discretionary release on parole "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of
duties". Id. at 5.
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law; 4 1 2) whether the inmate's release will be incompatible with
the welfare of society; 4 2 and 3) whether release will not so deprecate the seriousness of the crime so as to undermine respect
for law. 4 3 Typically, under the current practice of the Board in
its exercise of discretionary release power, one standard of denial
will be "bootstrapped" by another. 4 4 To illustrate, standard "two"
is traditionally tied-in to a denial predicated upon "one" or
"three", either of the remaining standards, using "if-then" logic. 4 5
Consequently, the typical parole release denial often follows a
predictably textbook form and employ the following trademarkboilerplate language:
Parole denied. Hold 24 months. The serious nature and circumstances of the instant offense 046 militates against discretionary release at this time. To hold otherwise would deprecate the seriousness of the crime so as to undermine
respect for the law and thus constitute a threat to the welfare of society. 4 7
On the other hand, in the alternative, the release denial might
flatly provide:
Parole is denied at this time. Next appearance: 24 months.
It is the opinion of this panel that, based on the nature of
your criminality and our concerns regarding recidivism, if
released, you will not live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, thus making your discretionary release incompatible with the safety and well-being of the commu-

41 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i[2](c) (McKinney 1997) (discussing first category relevant in denying or granting parole).
42 See id. (discussing second category relevant in denying or granting parole).
43 See id. (discussing third category relevant in denying or granting parole).
44 See Maye v. Russi, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996). A review panel
found reasonable probability that, "if released, the [prisoner] would not live nor remain
at liberty without violating the law and [therefore] that [prisoner's] release [was] not
compatible with the welfare of society". Id. at 28.
45 See id. at 28. The Maye court reasoned that the decision of the Parole Board did
"nothing more than track the language in the statute." Id. The Board did not consider the
factors enumerated in § 259-i, nor did its decision contain any analysis or factual basis.
Id. The court found the logical connection was missing as to why petitioner's crime
"automatically translated into a reasonable probability" that she would commit further
crimes if released. Id.
46 At this point in the decision, the Board usually renders a cursorily brief recitation
of the facts of the particular case.
47 See, e.g., People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881,
883 (lst Dep't 1983) (stating Board's standard form for denying parole).
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nity." 48
In each case cited above, an adverse finding as to standards
one and three automatically translates into an adverse finding
as to standard two. 4 9 Standing alone, standard two is insufficient
and must be supported by an additional factual predicate. 5 0 In
any event, the finding should be logically reconciled with the
particular facts of the case under consideration. A finding as to
probable future criminality should be based on indicators and/or
some profile that reasonably translates into such a presumption.5 1 In making this translation, however, the Board should be
guided by sound logic, rather than basing its determinations on
mere speculation or whim. Sound logic would also be the controlling element by which to interpret and define the parameters
of a standard "three-release denial," with due regard to the legislative intent, the ultimate controlling principle. A definition of
"deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect
52
for law" is thus in order.
The two key words in this piece of legislation are "deprecate"
(to have or to express an unfavorable opinion), and "undermine"
(to lessen or deplete the strength of). 53 When viewing the statute
as a whole, as we must, deprecation of a crime which would undermine respect for law occurs only when an inmate is paroled
48 See, e.g., Maye v. Russi, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996). The decision
of the Parole Board stated: "[Tlhere is a reasonable probability, if released, you would not
live nor remain at liberty without violating the law and that your release at this time is
not compatible with the welfare of society." Id.
49 See id. at 28. The Maye court also rejected the notion that the adverse finding as
to the nature and seriousness of petitioner's crime "automatically translated" into "reasonable probability" petitioner would commit further crimes. Id.
50 See Confoy v. New York State Division of Parole, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dep't
1991) (holding Board's decision that petitioner would not remain at liberty and release
would be incompatible with welfare of society was supported by evidence and made in
accordance with law, thus foreclosing judicial intervention); see also Lynch v. New York
State Divison of Parole, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (3d Dep't 1981) (finding reasons given by
board for its decision, including serious nature of crime, sufficient for denial of parole);
Maye v. Russi, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996) (finding no factual basis for
Board's decision denying parole).
51 See Maye v. Russi, N.Y.L.J, Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996) (suggesting analysis or factual basis for Board's conclusion to grant or deny is necessary).
52 See Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter ProhibitionConditions, 37
WASH. U.J.URB. & CONTERM. L. 291, 323 (1990) (discussing factors relevant to parole
determinations so as to not depreciate seriousness of crime or undermine respect for
law); see also Bales, supra note 19, at 57 (acknowledging factors weighed in parole decision so that release will not depreciate seriousness of crime or undermine respect for
law).
53 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 383 (2d ed. 1985) (defining common under-

standings of "undermine" and "depreciate").
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prior to the time the sentencing court indicates that release
would be acceptable. 54 Sentencing courts provide clear, statutorily based guidance for determining when release is acceptable.
The minimum term of imprisonment, and must first be served in
full"rehabilitation" must be evident. 5 5
The Board, then, in making its determinations, must not
rely solely upon the seriousness of the instant offense. 5 6 Indeed,
in Maye v. Russi,57 the reviewing court held that the Board of
Parole must rely upon more than simply the inmate's crime of
conviction in order to deny parole release, 5 8 and must also provide a detailed statement of the reasons for parole denial. 5 9 The
Maye court also determined that the Board of Parole must articulate "the logical connection which demonstrates why [the inmate's] crime automatically translates into a 'reasonable prob60
ability' that the [inmate] will break the law 0 if released...."
54 See Garcia v. New York State Division of Parole, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dep't
1997) (holding where sentencing court, not Board, has set minimum sentence of imprisonment, Board must consider seriousness of offense and inmate's prior criminal record).
55 See, e.g., Matter of King v. Division of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 251 (1st Dep't
1993), affd 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 955 (1994) (suggesting showing of rehabilitation on part of
inmate is factor which weighs in favor of granting release to parole).
56 See Matter of Quartararo, Aug. 8, 1995 N.Y.L.J., at 23 (S.Ct. N.Y. Cty 1994)
(holding statutory factors were not fairly and properly applied in petitioner's parole
hearing).
57 See Maye v. Russi, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996) (holding parole
application cannot be "pre-determined" and Board must consider factors enumerated in
statute).
58 See id. at 28; see also People ex rel. DiCostanzo v. Hernandez, 525 N.Y.S.2d 325,
326 (2d Dep't 1988), appeal denied 530 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1988) (holding consideration for
release is not limited to good behavior, but also given to whether there is reasonable
probability inmate will remain at liberty without violating law if released, release will
not endanger society and will not so deprecate seriousness of crime to undermine respect
for law); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Board of Parole, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884
(1st Dep't 1983) (holding statute does not specify how much weight must be given to each
enumerated factor).
59 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW §259-i[2](a) (McKinney Supp. 1997) (requiring Board to inform inmate of reasons, given in detail, for denial of parole); see also Maye v. Russi,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996) (finding Board did not comply with this
statutory requirement because only reasons given for decision denying parole were based
on petitioner's original offense as indicated in language of decision itself); Delman v.
Board of Parole, 461 N.Y.S.2d 406, 406 (2d Dep't 1983) (holding reasons set forth by
Board for denial of parole release were supported by record and satisfied statutory requirements); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, Parole Board Division, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (4th Dep't 1979) (finding Board's
statement denying parole sufficiently set out "essential facts and reasons" for denial);
Hergueta v. New York State Parole Board, 405 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (2d Dep't 1978) (holding that "sufficient and meaningful reasons" were given by Board and represented
"proper application of criteria" of statute).
60 See Maye v. Russi, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 28 (1st Dep't 1996); see also Canales
v. Hammock, 431 N.Y.S.2d 787, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (finding "if the 'seriousness of
the crime' factor was to have been of paramount importance to the relative exclusion of
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This notwithstanding, it is neither arbitrary nor capricious to
deny parole where the Board has a rational basis to conclude
that an applicant will be unable to live a crime-free life in the
community. 6 1 Nor, for that matter, is it an abuse of discretion
when the Board considers such negative factors as the seriousness of the instant offense, the number of multiple counts in the
indictment, the prior criminal history of the applicant, and any
opposition filed by the district attorney. 6 2 As long as the Board's
determination is supported by the record, and is made in accordance with the law, judicial intervention is necessarily foreclosed. 6 3 Also properly subject to consideration is the prior criminal history of the applicant, 64 any history of alcohol or drug
abuse, 6 5 past violations of probation or parole, 6 6 a documented
all other factors, then the legislature would have so provided"); Rogers v. Hammock, 418
N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding Board must "do more than merely state
'the nature of [inmate's] criminal offense"' in order to comply with statutory requirement
of providing reasons for Board's decisions); Bermudez v. Kuhlmann, 386 N.Y.S.2d
772,773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding Parole Board statement that parole was denied because of "the nature of the offense" did not provide "meaningful statement of reasons as
required by statute").
61 See Matter of Campbell v. Rodriguez, 549 N.Y.S.2d 926, 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(holding Board's denial of parole on grounds that petitioner was unable to live crime-free
in community and posed threat to society was not arbitrary and capricious). Cf. Telefarro
v. Hammock, 444 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (2d Dep't 1981) (holding Board's finding that overriding
consideration must weigh in favor of community protection, was arbitrary and capricious).
62 See Confoy v. Division of Parole, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dep't 1991) (finding
respondent's decision to deny parole was "supported by the record and made in accordance with the law, thereby foreclosing judicial intervention"); see also Israel v. Division
of Parole, 603 N.Y.S.2d 779, 779 (3d Dep't 1993) (finding Board's determination denying
parole based upon "seriousness of crimes, their violent nature and petitioner's criminal
record, indicating escalating criminal conduct" was supported by record and made in accordance with law); Walker v. Russi, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (3d Dep't 1991) (holding determination by Board to deny parole that cited petitioner's criminal history and prior parole
violation was not arbitrary and was supported by record and made in accordance with
law).
63 See Matter of McKee v. Board of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945 (3d Dep't 1990)
(holding that in absence of showing of "irrationality" or other basis for judicial intervention, decision of Board was un-reviewable); see also Gray v. Travis, 657 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119
(3d Dep't 1997) (holding decisions of Board are discretionary and not subject to judicial
review when made in accordance with law); Secilmic v. Keane, 639 N.Y.S.2d 437, 437 (2d
Dept 1996) (holding decisions of Board that take statutory requirements into consideration are not judicially reviewable).
64 See, e.g., Farid v. Russi, 629 N.Y.S.2d 821, 821 (3d Dep't 1995) (upholding Board's
decision denying parole that was based on gravity of petitioner's offenses and other past
criminal behavior); Matter of Maturano v. Hammock, 87 A.D.2d 732, 732-33 (3d Dep't
1982) (holding Board was not precluded from considering seriousness of offenses and petitioner's past criminal history); Ward v. Hammock, 456 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dep't
1982) (holding Board could properly consider seriousness of petitioner's offenses as well
as past criminal history).
65 See Matter of Maciag v. Hammock, 88 A.D.2d 1106, 1107 (3d Dep't 1982) (holding
that parole board properly considered petitioner's admitted problem with drugs and alco-
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history or record of mental or emotional instability6 7 or the failure of the applicant to take responsibility for his own criminally
deviant behavior. 68 Accordingly, the role of the Board is not to
simply re-sentence an applicant, but to determine whether he or
she should be released into the community under parole supervision based upon the totality of the circumstances. 69 The granting
of supervised releases based on these criteria then, bespeaks the
more immediate concern that the inmate will continue in criminal behavior, thereby endangering the welfare of the general
0
public. 7
A fortiori, the record of the parole hearing must support the
contention that the Board considered all of the relevant statutory factors. 7 1 The statutory criteria are set forth in the Executive Law to prevent the Board of Parole from instituting its own
hol in determining his minimum period of imprisonment). See, e.g., McLain v. New York
State Division of Parole, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that Board acted
in accordance with statutory criteria in considering inmate's pattern of offenses, history
of alcohol abuse, and seriousness of present offense as reasons for denial of parole); People ex rel. Miranda v. Henderson, 387 N.Y.S.2d 329, 329 (4th Dep't 1976) (upholding
Board's consideration of petitioner's extensive past history of drug abuse as reason for
denial of parole).
66 See e.g., Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 605 N.Y.S.2d 148, 148 (3d
Dep't 1993) (holding reasons for denial of parole, which included consideration of several
instances of past parole violations, were not subject to further judicial review).
67 See Dudley v. Travis, 642 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (3d Dep't 1996) (holding petitioner's
prior history of mental illness could properly be considered in determining release to parole); see also Baker v. Russi, 591 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (3d Dep't 1992) (finding reasons
given by Board for denial of parole based on petitioner's apparent need for psychological
counseling were supported by record); People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, Parole Board Division, 415 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (4th Dep't
1979) (holding Board may properly consider petitioner's mental and emotional stability
in determining release to parole).
68 See, e.g., Dudley, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 386 (holding that Board properly considered petitioner's lack of remorse over crime in denying release to parole); Matter of Flecha v.
Russi, 221 A.D.2d 780, 781(3d Dep't 1995), leave to appeal denied by 641 N.Y.S.2d 597
(1996) (upholding Board's consideration of inmate's failure to take responsibility for his
deviant behavior in denying parole).
69 See, e.g., People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Board of Parole, 468 N.Y.S.2d
881, 884 (1st Dep't 1983) (finding statute mandates that Board considers certain criteria,
but does not specify how much weight must be given to each enumerated factor);
McKnight v. Hammock, 422 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding Parole Board
must exercise its discretion in denying parole in conformance with powers granted it by
statute and pursuant to its own published regulations).
70 See Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 76 (1980)
(holding that Board had authority to fix minimum period of incarceration in excess of one
third maximum even though sentencing court could not have done so); Matter of King v.
New York State Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1993), affd, 83 N.Y.2d 788
(1994) (holding that Parole Board erred in denying prisoner proper remedy).
71 See Matter of King v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245,250 (1st
Dep't 1993) (asserting that Board has affirmative obligation to review relevant factors in
determining whether prisoner is eligible for parole).
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brand of "preventive detention" and to ensure fairness at the release hearing. 72 Accordingly, all relevant criteria designated by
statute must be appropriately considered.
An additional factor to be noted here is the parole "guideline
time range," which must be considered in each case. 73 The
guidelines were intended to be applied in cases where the sentencing court set the minimum term of imprisonment when the
minimum term had been served. 74 The provisions of the sentencing laws now suggest that the courts in imposing the sentence undertake the appropriate assessment of the "crime severity" and "prior criminal history." 75 In the majority of cases
coming before the Board, the minimum sentence fixed by the
court exceeds the Board's guideline time range. To be sure, by
the Board's re-litigation of such factors as crime severity and
prior criminal history, an obvious "double accounting" results,
with possible double jeopardy implications and encroachment on
the doctrines of collateralestoppel and res judicata.76
While Executive Law §259-i provides that the parole guidelines
shall include consideration of the "seriousness of the instant offense," the statute demands that this be done "with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court... "77 The phrase
"seriousness of the offense" has today become nothing more than
a hollow cich6 espoused by the Board in seeming compliance
with the requirements of the statute. It actually does little else
than simply track the language of the statute, in boilerplate
fashion, which obfuscates a substantial portion of the first and
foremost guideline, "due consideration to the type... [and] length
72 See id. (outlining sphere of executive review).
73 See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8001.3(a) (1997); Ganci v. Hammock, 471 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632
(1984) (setting forth guideline range designed to structure Board's discretion).
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (b)(2) (allowing court that imposes sentence and fixes maximum term to allow Commission to determine when to grant parole); Andrew Von Hirsch,
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 367, 379-80 (1989) (discussing Commission's use of parole guidelines).
75 See N.Y. PENAL LAW Article 70.00 (GCL 1998); see also Kennard R.Strutin, MandatoryMinimums, Life Sentences and the Eighth Amendment, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6, 6 (Nov.
1994) (discussing factors relevant in assessing sentences).
76 See generally King v. New York State Division of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 251
(lst Dep't 1993) (stating that Parole Board is not authorized to re-sentence prisoners but
should assess prisoner in terms of all relevant factors in deciding on release);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1A (1982) (noting the relitigation problem in

criminal cases is determined to a large extent by the double jeopardy concept).
77 See generally N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-I (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994).
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of the sentence." 78
This section of the statute imposes upon the Board an affirmative responsibility to duly consider and evaluate the type and
length of the sentence imposed, as opposed to merely focusing on
the seriousness of the underlying criminal offense, to the exclusion of all other relevant criteria. 79 The question presented by
this particular portion of the statute then becomes: what constitutes "due consideration" in the context of "type" and "length" of
sentence. 80 Currently, no legal standard exists to proffer definitive guidance as to precisely what consideration is "due." In fact,
this view of the statute may present a novel perspective to the
Executive Law.

81

By law and definition, "a statute or a legislative act is to be
construed as a whole, and all parts of an act are to be read and
construed together to determine their legislative intent."82
Moreover, it is established that "[t]he primary consideration of
the courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature." 83 In keeping with this
principle, it is essential that "[t]he intention of the Legislature
[be] first [ ] sought from a literal meaning of the act itself, but if
the meaning is still not clear the intent may be ascertained by
such facts and through such rules as may, in connection with the
language, legitimately reveal it."84 Clearly, because there exists
no case-law to guide the interpretation of the identified portion
of the statute, we must turn to "such facts and through such
rules as may, in connection with the language, legitimately reveal it."8 5 Facts and rules in connection with the language are in
78 See generally N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 259-i[1](a)(i) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994).
79 See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (holding that
the inmate was not afforded a proper parole hearing where one commissioner considered
factors outside the scope of the statute); People ex rel. DiCostanzo v. Hernandez, 525
N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (2d Dep't 1984) (holding that Board's discretionary release decision is
not subject to judicial review when it acts in accordance with statutory requirements).
80 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §259-i[1](a) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994).
81 See 1977 N.Y. LAws c 904 (stating that Board has responsibility to inquire into
prisoner's record while in prison, whether he will be employable upon release, and
whether he is generally eligible for parole).
82 See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 97 (McKinney 1998) (stating wholistic approach to statutory
construction).
83 Id. at § 92(b) (stating secondary source for legislative meaning); see also People v.
Ruggieri, 423 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (N.Y. Sup. 1979) (explaining that "the court will resort to
extraneous materials).
84 See id. (expressing need to resort to secondary sources).
85 Id.
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abundance, however, and accordingly, the most revealing sources
deserving attention in this context are the sentencing laws and
the extraordinary guidance they offer.
SENTENCING LAW IN NEW YORK STATE

Imposition of a sentence upon conviction for an offense is a judicial function. 8 6 The exercise of judicial power in this regard
must be performed free from outside pressures and is closely delineated by legislation. 87 Ideally, a court exercises its sentencing
authority only after careful consideration of all the facts available at the time of the sentencing. 8 8 Hence, not unlike the task
of the Parole Board, the trial court must also balance conflicting
concerns to take into account, among other things, the crime
charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before
the court, and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation, isolation, retribution and deterrence. 8 9 In
practice, the instances where a court can exercise full sentencing
discretion are those where there is a conviction after trial or a
plea to the indictment. At this juncture, for the benefit of those
less acquainted with "sentencing law," some definitions and a
brief analysis of the typical sentence seems in order.
In cases where an indeterminate sentence has been imposed,
that sentence is composed of two numbers, usually set by statute. 9 0 The first number represents the "minimum term" of incar86 But see Pamela Griset, 35 No. 3 JUDGE'S J. 3, 3 (1996) (asserting that parole officials may exercise sentencing power as well).
87 See Keri A. Gould, Turing Rat and Doing Time For Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for Law?, 10
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 835, 857-59 (1993) (acknowledging that imposition of sentencing guidelines curtained judges discretion in fashioning appropriate sentences); Elizabeth
T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1179, 1208-09 (1993) (characterizing history of criminal punishments as "legislatively fixed").
88 See Robert H. Smith, Departure Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: Should
Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstances Be Deemed "Adequately" Considered Through
"NegativeImplication'?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 270 (1994) (acknowledging factors relevant
in sentencing determination).
89 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW §1.05 (5); People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302,
305(1981) (outlining specific purposes of penal sanction); People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d
340, 346 (1980) (detailing key purposes and goals of criminal justice system); People v.
Notey, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (acknowledging factors relevant to parole decision) (1st
Dep't 1980); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238 (1974) (noting characteristics of criminal sentencing policy justifications).
90 See People v. Warden, 345 N.Y.S.2d 381, 393-94 (1973) (defining "indeterminate
sentence" as sentence which shall not give specific period but shall not be less than one
year); People v. Martin, 276 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17 (1966) (defining indeterminate sentence of
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ceration. That is, the statutory minimum amount of time which
must be served by an inmate before achieving parole eligibility.
The minimum term, by law and definition, is a penal sanction
which is commensurate with the perceived severity of the
crime. 9 1 The second number of an indeterminate prison sentence
is the "maximum term" of imprisonment. 9 2 The "maximum" is
actually the point at which the sentence expires and the inmate
must be released from confinement or discharged from parole,
whichever condition is complied with first. 9 3 The sentencing
judge selects minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment
from a range of possible sentences prescribed by the Legislature
for the particular offense. 94 The sentencing judge determines the
ultimate question of an appropriate sentence for the offender,
based on a number of criteria including, but not limited to, the
seriousness of the offense, the social history of the offender, and
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances unearthed during
the trial, plea or sentence proceedings. 9 5 Also factored into this
judicial determination are any memoranda submitted by the
probation department and the recommendations made by the
District Attorney and the defense counsel. 9 6
In meting out a sentence, a judge gives express or implied
guidance to a future Parole Board as to how the offense is to be
viewed. First, we will consider what is implied by a judge who is
silent as to a sentence that has been imposed. We will also consider the impact of a judicial "recommendation."
second degree murder as not less than twenty years but not more then life).
91 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.09(2)(McKinney 1998) (linking minimum term
with severity of crime).
92 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §70.00(1) (McKinney 1998) (indicating that maximum and
minimum term are to be set for indeterminate prison sentence).
93 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2) (McKinney 1998) (authorizing maximum terms for
various classes of felonies).
94 See N.Y. PENAL LAW, Art. 70.00 (McKinney GCL 1998); see also Harold Baer, Jr. &
Richard S. Mills, Discretion and Disparity on the Criminal Side of the Supreme Court in
New York County, 31 N.Y.L.SCH. L. REV. 691, 692 (1986) (finding that sentences imposed
on white collar and common criminals are widely disproportionate based on individual's
judgment's subjective nature).
95 See NEWYORK CRIM. PROC. LAw § 380.10, et seq. (McKinney 1999); People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305 (1981) (holding that sentence for defendant who has pled guilty
to charge of manslaughter, requiring sentence of twelve and one half years to twenty five
years, can be reduced further upon discretion of presiding judge, based on certain criteria).
96 See N.Y. CRIM .PROC.LAw § 390.40, et seq. (McKinney 1994) (acknowledging defendant's or prosecutor's pre-sentence memorandum which can set forth any information
pertinent prior to sentencing).
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Whether a judicially imposed sentence constitutes the statutory minimum or maximum---or anywhere within that range-is
of no import. The fact remains that, absent express guidance
from the sentencing court, it must be presumed that the term ultimately imposed was determined upon evaluating all relevant
factors, and that it was therefore appropriate. 9 7 Accordingly, in
the rare instance where a sentencing judge finds that the sentence imposed is inappropriate, the record will certainly reflect
as much.9 8 A reasonable inference to be drawn, then, is that, if
due consideration has been given by the court to the length and
type of sentence imposed, parole release should occur at the first
instance of eligibility. 99 Under this theory, there should be a presumption that the inmate's institutional programming and disciplinary record suggest that release to parole supervision is appropriate. 10 0 What the Board should be doing in making the
release assessment is determining the overall comportment of
the inmate during the period of incarceration. In addition, when
the minimum term has been served, the Board should concern
itself primarily with the inmate's rehabilitation. 10 1 In such
cases, since parole would not deprecate the seriousness of the in97 See Farrar,52 N.Y.2d at 305 (1981) (noting appropriate sentence requires discretion and consideration of particular factors).
98 In that rare case, the appropriate remedy can be applied through the appellate
process. See, e.g., Farrar,52 N.Y.2d at 303 (holding that sentencing judge erred in being
"bound" and imposing bargained-for sentence that court determined was inappropriate);
People v. Grey, 157 A.D.2d 596, 598 (1st Dep't 1990) (sentence modified where sentencing
court found that minimum sentence was more appropriate than sentence bargained for);
People v. Carpino, 96 A.D.2d 489, 490 (1st Dep't 1989) (finding error for court to be
"bound" to accept plea based on sentence it determined was too harsh); People v.
Martinez, 124 A.D.2d 505, 506 (1st Dep't 1986) (re-sentencing was required where court
stated that it was bound by plea agreement contrary to its own decision that more lenient sentence was appropriate).
99 See Schwimmer v. Hunham, 91 A.D.2d 100, 103 (2d Dep't 1983) (stating inmate
becomes eligible for parole at end of minimum term); see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 851
(McKinney 1998) (providing for purposes of this article Parole eligibility attaches upon
expiration of minimum period of imprisonment fixed by court).
100 See 83 N.Y. JUR. 2D Penal Inst. § 217 (1990) (listing program participation and
disciplinary record among factors to be considered in determining parole eligibility).
101 See People ex rel. Montana v. McGee, 16 N.Y.S.2d 162, 168 (N.Y. Sup. 1939) (explaining that "[parole's] function should be [the] fixation of the minimum term, supervision, control, guardianship, and rehabilitation during the period of conditional release");
see also Kimberly K. Hall, Criminal Law - Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: Plea
Agreements are not Sufficient Justificationfor Departure, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189,
191 (1997) (describing indeterminate sentencing wherein "a parole board determined if
offender had under-gone sufficient rehabilitation" after offender served minimum term);
Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel & Unusual Punishment, or Just Plain
Cruel?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 94 (1990) (explaining that after minimum term prisoner's rehabilitation would be considered by parole board).
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10 2
stant offense, parole should be granted at first eligibility.
Such a decision would be appropriate because, as it has been argued above, a penalty commensurate with the severity of the
crime charged has already been paid. To hold otherwise would
contravene the sentencing policy of this state as set forth by
statute.
Given the strong presumption of correctness inherent in any
sentence, the Board of Parole should give due deference to a sen10 3 Of
tencing judge's "recommendation," placed on the record.
course, absent ambiguity, any recommendation made by the sentencing court must be interpreted by the fair import of its terms
and should not be second-guessed. In that regard, the Board, in
deferring to the sentencing court's discretion, must logically rec10 4
oncile its release decision with that determination.

THE PRISON SYSTEM AND PAROLE
Crime victims and their families are among the most fervent
supporters of the abolition of parole. 10 5 The press and politicians
continue to agitate public sentiment for the maximum confinement of the violent felony offender. 106 This is furthered by a
state prison system which today provides few of the rehabilitative resources which were in place prior to this governor's lead102 See generally Spiros A. Tsimbinos & Peter Lagonikos, Conditions of Probation:
From Rehabilitationto Public Safety and Community Service, 1997 NO. 25 N.Y. CRIM. L.
NEWS 1. "A probationary sentence is... a method of offering an offender an opportunity
to rehabilitate himself." Id.
103 See generally State Judges Question FurtherLimitations on Parole, 1996 No. 14
N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS 13. New York Association of Supreme Court Judges issued resolutions against Governor Pataki's plans for further reduction of parole eligibility. Id. at 1.
104 But see Matter of Russo v. Board of Parole, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984 (1980) (holding
that Parole Board may establish minimum term of imprisonment greater than 1/3 of offender's maximum sentence).
105 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.50(1) (McKinney 1998) (allowing victim to write
impact statement to State Division of Parole); see also Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the
Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of the Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 367,
383 (1997) (citing final report issued by President's Taskforce on Victims of Crime, 1982,
in which victims seek to abolish parole).
106 See PresidentialCandidatesRespond to AJS Questions About Justice System, 80
JUDICATURE 93, 93 (1996) (quoting Bob Dole as stating, "I will work with the Nation's
governors to end the revolving door justice system by abolishing parole for violent criminals"); see also S.J. RES. 3, 106th CONG. 1999 (proposing amendment to United States
Constitution to protect rights of crime victims); Dennis C. Vacco, Our Freedoms Can Best
Be Celebrated by Taking the Steps to Protect Them, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1998, at S3 (advocating elimination of parole for violent criminals, and increased victim participation in
parole process).
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ership of the state. Apparently, no serious thought has been
given to the fact that these men and women have been sentenced
to serve out their prison terms in the ostensible hope of being
"rehabilitated". As a consequence, vocational training, graduated release, college programs, and even such basic necessities
as a GED diploma, have either been severely curtailed, or eliminated completely. 10 7 The clear result of these limitations is a
protracted stay behind bars with little or no opportunity for educational and skill acquisition available to increase the prospects
for success after release. 108 This result appears to be in direct
contravention of the criteria for parole release outlined in Executive Law §259-i, providing that the Board must consider the applicant's institutional record, including "program goals, academic
assignvocational
training or work
accomplishments,
ments.. .release plans including community resources and employment... "109
To be sure, the foregoing mandate actually renders the parole
evaluation a contradiction in terms, for not only has the Department of Correctional Services severely cut educational and
vocational training, the Board, in many cases, fails to adequately
consider this information in the first place. According to statistics released by the Division of Parole in 1995, release to parole
supervision has been severely curtailed. Those convicted of
homicide have a release rate of approximately 20%, robbery 61%,

107 See Richard Tewksbury & Jon Marc Taylor, The Consequencesof EliminatingPell
Grant Eligibility for Students in Post-Secondary CorrectionalEducation Programs, 60Sep FED. PROBATION 60 (1996) (discussing trend and effects of recent budget cuts and
subsequent elimination of educational programs for incarcerated offenders).
108 See Michael K. Greene, "Show Me the Money!" Should Taxpayer Funds Be Used
to Educate Prisoners under the Guise of Reducing Recidivism? 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 173, 187 (1998) (discussing how prisoner education programs as-

sume that by educating inmates, inmates' chances of being reincarcerated is lowered,
while their potential for making positive contributions to society after release increases);
see also Jurg Gerber & Eric J. Fritsch, Adult Academic & Vocational CorrectionalEducation Programs:A review of Recent Reseach, 22 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 119, 135-37 (1995)
(explaining that "the research shows a fair amount of support for the hypotheses that the
adult academic and vocational correctional education programs lead to fewer disciplinary
violations during incarceration, reductions in recidivism, to increases in employment opportunities, and to increases in participation in education upon release") cited in Lynn M.
Burley, History Repeats Itself in the Resurrection of Prisoner Chain Gangs: Alabama's
ExperienceRaises Eigth Amendment Concerns, 15 LAW & INEQ. 127, 155 n.54 (1997).
109 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-I (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994); Matter of Garcia v.
New York State Division of Parole, N.Y.L.J., May 3, 1996, at 29; rev'd on other grounds.
239 A.D.2d 235, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1997, at 27 (holding that Board must consider totality
of factors and circumstances when denying parole).
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burglary 64%, assault 38% and rape 4%.110 Since the beginning
of 1997, those rates have continued to drop even further, particularly when the budget crisis in the state legislature and senate created a demand for prison cells, thereby making parole release a perverted political tool in the equation. 1 1 1 According to
former State Criminal Justice Coordinator Paul Schectman, "the
board has come to appreciate a fundamental principle of this
administration: violent offenders should not be released
2
early." 11
Not only does this political policy subvert due process and
equal protection guarantees, it also ignores the fact that the
Board of Parole in the State of New York does not release an inmate from his sentence early!113 There is a popular public misconception known as "early" release to parole, and only the
"Shock Incarceration Program" 1 14 may deduct time from the
minimum period of imprisonment for carefully screened nonviolent offenders completing its requirements. 1 15 Ideally, the
minimum term of imprisonment represents the precise time
when a rehabilitatedinmate should be released, but there is no
"early" release on parole in New York State. An inmate can only
be released after serving the full minimum term of imprisonment.
Hence, the minimum term is that period of time that must be
110 See New York State Criminal Law Statistics, 1998 No. 31 N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS 17
(providing statistics for both 1994 and 1998).
111 See Tsimbinos, supra note 5. Concerns exist that the jail population will shortly
explode due to a reduction of parole possibilities for inmates. Id.
112 See id.
113 See Gary Spencer, Pataki ProposesBill to End Parolefor Violent Felons, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 12, 1998, at 1, col.3 (reporting that Governor Pataki's measure would eliminate the
early release available under the current parole system); see also Gary Spencer, Assembly Adopts Curbs on Parole,N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1998, at 1 (noting Assembly passed Governor Pataki's bill to eliminate discretionary parole for all first-time violent felons).
114 See 18 U.S.C. § 4046. Shock incarceration programs offer inmates rigorous discipline, and physical training together with counseling services. Id. at (b)(1) -(b)(2). See
also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 865-867 (McKinney 1998) (defining shock incarcerations' eligibility requirements and program duration); Pamela L. Griset, Discretion, Disparity and
Discriminationin Sentencing: Where Have All the Critics Gone?, 35 No. 3 JUDGES J. 3, 6
(1996) (expressing concern about lack of judicial review in shock incarceration program).
115 See N.Y. CORRECT LAW § 865-867 (McKinney 1998). An eligible inmate is defined
as an inmate serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment who is under 26 years of
age, who is eligible for parole within three years, has not previously been convicted of a
felony upon which an indeterminate term of imprisonment had been imposed and who
was between the ages of 16 and 26 when the crime was committed. Id. Persons convicted
of certain specified offenses including homicide, rape, sodomy and escape and later vehicular manslaughter are not "eligible" under the shock incarceration program. Id.
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served in full, before parole can be considered. 116 It is actually a
period of parole "in-eligibility." 117 The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence provides the state with a safety zone, by
which a "hold" of up to twenty-four months may be applied by
the Board if it appears that the inmate has not been fully rehabilitated after the expiration of the minimum term. 118 The "conditional release" is that date upon which the inmate may be released, upon completion of two-thirds of the maximum sentence,
with one-third of the sentence deducted from the maximum term
for good-time credit. 119 In contrast, the "max" date also acts as a
deterrent from bad behavior because it represents a substantial
portion of the time an inmate owes, which the inmate otherwise
remains legally subject to serve. 120 In this way, the loss of goodtime credit from the conditional release date, and service of the
"max" date, acts as the catalyst for an inmate to "try" for reha12
bilitation, often successfully. 1
Though often misunderstood, parole supervision serves the
general public by fulfilling a number of important functions.
First, it ensures that supervision takes place and helps minimize
the risk that ex-offenders will commit new crimes. 122 While in
prison, planning for parole release serves to motivate inmates to
116 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805 (McKinney 1998) (contemplating parole eligibility
only after minimum term); Pike v. New York State Div. of Parole, 560 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272
(N.Y.Sup. 1990) (emphasizing that parole release is default at completion of minimum
term); see also Walker v. Oswald, 449 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining that minimum sentence imposed by court is irrevocable declaration that defendant must serve
specified period of time in prison before parole board is empowered to release him).
117 See id. (explaining that parole becomes option only after service of minimum
term).
118 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a) (McKinney 1998) (explaining that if parole is
denied at first hearing, reconsideration must take place within twenty-four months).
119 See N.Y. CORRECT LAW § 803(1)(b) (McKinney 1999) (establishing cap for good
behavior allowance at one third of maximum sentence imposed by court).
120 See Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel & Unusual Punishment, or
Just Plain Cruel?, 16 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM & CIv. CONFINEMENT 89, 120 n.3 (1990). "If
the prisoner is not granted parole after the minimum number of years, his sentence
takes on a much higher level of uncertainty; hence the term 'indeterminate sentence.'
After a parole denial, the only 'sure thing' is release at the maximum term of years." Id.
121 See People v. Wade, 266 Cal. App. 2d 918, 928-29, (1968) (explaining that indeterminate sentence law, affords person convicted of crime opportunity to minimize term
of imprisonment by rehabilitating himself in such manner that he may again become
useful member of society); see also James B. Jacob, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good
Time, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 217, 225 (1982) (explaining how use of good time drastically
reduces sentences, also explains that good time is used as punitive device).
122 See Loren A.N. Buddress, FederalProbation and PretrialServices - A Cost Effective and Successful Community CorrectionsSystem, 61 MAR. FED. PROBATION. 5, 6 (1997)
(explaining that pretrial and probations officers most help community by helping excriminals contribute to society).
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adjust their behavior and acts, as an incentive to take part in
treatment programs. 12 3 Movements to abolish parole disregard
the fact that an increase in parole supervision, designed to help
inmates succeed, actually enhances public safety, since continued
confinement of a rehabilitated individual beyond the minimum
term no longer serves a legitimate state interest. Secondly, parole supervision saves tax dollars and can prove to be a far superior means of helping the offender make a smooth transition
back to a lawful lifestyle, thus ensuring the safety of the community at an affordable cost. 124
The Board must assess whether the inmate "will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law," 12 5 thus the Board is
faced with the difficult task of predicting propensity for criminal
behavior. 12 6 The Board must also determine future criminality,
12 7
based in large part on indicators that are not in the record.
The complex matrix of information before the Board must be
logically reconciled with statistics of successful parolee profiles,
as well as the previous criminal record (if any) fitting a recidivist
123 See 18 U.S.C. § 4046. Treatment programs such as "shock incarceration" serve as
one example. Id.
124 See Sunny A.M. Koshy, The Right of fAll] the People to be Secure: Extending Fundamental FourthAmendment Rights to Probationersand Parolees,39 HASTINGS L.J. 449,
466 (1988) (positing that conditional releases are more cost-effective than prolonged incarceration); Paul H. Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United
States, 8 CRIM L.F.1, 8 (1997) (describing parole as cost effective deterrent). But see Thomas J. Bamonte, The Viability of Morrissey v. Brewer and the Due Process Rights of Parolees and Other ConditionalReleasees, 18 S. ILL. U.L.J. 121, 132 (1993) (explaining that
parole has become less tool of rehabilitation than cost-effective means of extending surveillance and discipline of penitentiary).
125 See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 259-i[2](c) (McKinney 1998) (necessitating calculation of
potential recidivism); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408, U.S. 471, 482 (S.Ct. 1972) (stating that "[tihe parolee has been released from prison based on an evaluation that he
shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible,
self-reliant person").
126 See Melinda K. Blatt, State Liability for Injuries Inflicted by Parolees,56 U. CINN.
L. REV. 615, 615 (1987) (arguing that inherent difficulty of predicting post-release criminality necessitates absolute immunity for allegedly negligent release); Travis & O'Leary,
A History of Parole, in PROBATION, PAROLE, AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 109 (3d ed.
1984) (citing studies showing high rates of recidivism cast doubt on ability of correctional
programs to rehabilitate prisoners; studies also suggest that parole boards have little accuracy in predicting future criminal behavior); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 40 (recent studies have shown failure of parole as rehabilitative because too little is
known about human behavior to rehabilitate prisoners or to determine when they are
rehabilitated), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN 3182, 3223. See generally Joseph T.
McCann, Risk Assessment and the Prediction of Violent Behavior, 44 FED. LAW. 18, 18
(1997) (summarizing the current status of clinical risk assessment and prediction of violent behavior).
127 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-I (2][c] (McKinney 1998) (enumerating factors to be
considered in making parole determination).
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profile. 128 In many cases today, this information simply is not
considered. Further aggravating this fact is the Board's tendency to disregard the "guideline time range," thereby creating
12 9
inequities as to prison time for specific offenses and offenders.
Adherence by the Board to its guidelines was intended to assess,
to the extent possible, that similar offenders would serve about
the same amount of time prior to release. Ideally, the Board's
release guidelines should be adhered to, because in effect, the
Board, determines how long convicted offenders stay in
prison. 13 0 The categories of the release guidelines were established to make the parole decision, including the fixing of minimum periods of imprisonment or ranges thereof "for different
categories of offenders." 13 1 It is unfortunate that today, the
guidelines are completely ignored in most cases and have not
been revised in since 1985.132
The inequity lies in the fact that, because the release guidelines are discretionary, reviewing courts will not intervene when
guideline time ranges for specific offenses are exceeded. 133 If the
128 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW §259-I[2][c] (impliedly requiring consideration of recidivism
and previous criminal history in determining "if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law").
129 See Ganci v. Hammock, 471 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (2d Dep't 1984) (board may fix
MPI outside guideline range or deny parole release to inmate who has served time in excess of guideline range, if it sets forth reasons for doing so in sufficient detail); see also 9
NYCRR 8001.3[c] (1997) (explaining that guidelines should not substitute for careful consideration of individual cases); Matter of Vuksanaj v. Hammock, 463 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (3d
Dep't 1995) (finding reasons given for deviation from MPI were sufficient).
130 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-c[1]. The New York "[S]tate Parole Board... ha[s] the
power and duty of determining which inmates... may be released on parole." Id.
131 See N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 259-c(4). Under this section, one Board mandate is to "establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law, including the fixing of minimum periods of imprisonment or ranges thereof for different
categories of offenders." Id.
132 See Thomas M. Stack, Guidelines for Sentencing, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 1994, at
A35. In 1985, the New York State Committee on Sentencing Guidelines submitted a report with recommendations, advocating an "elimination of indeterminate sentencing and
a phase of parole release." Id. "Assembly bill 7027... set forth the necessary changes to
the New York Penal Law, the Criminal Procedure Law, the Corrections Law, and the
Executive Law." Id. The issue, however, never came up for a vote in the Assembly. Id.
133 See Maciag v. Hammock, 453 N.Y.S.2d 56, 57 (1982) (considering refusal to interfere since there was no showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety to warrant judicial intervention in Board's decision); see also Weyant v. Hammock, 445 N.Y.S.2d 42,
42-43 (1981) (acknowledging that reasons set forth by State Board of Parole establishing
petitioner's minimum period of imprisonment of 36 months on a 0-4 year sentence were
sufficient to justify setting minimum period of imprisonment independent of guideline
rates); Rodriguez v. New York State Board of Parole, 421 N.Y.S.2d 437,438-39 (1979) (acknowledging that although minimum term imposed by Board of Parole exceeded time
range established pursuant to Board's own guidelines, such departure from guidelines
was supported). But see Edge v. Hammock, 438 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (3d Dep't 1981) (holding
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guideline time range were adhered to, in contemplation of the
legislative intent of its implementation, the range would serve to
enhance parole as a legitimate way of controlling prisoners; i.e.
well-behaved inmates would more likely be released within the
scope of the appropriate time range. 13 4 It is therefore obvious
that the guideline time range and the current pace of parole denials have yet to be reconciled. If the Board does not use or even
recognize the guidelines, then the Board should change tehm or
abandon them. It should not, however, ignore the guidelines by
encouraging activist parole board members to accomplish goals
35
that even the governor has failed to push for legislatively. 1
Once an inmate is placed under parole supervision, parole officers offer counseling, referral and job-finding services, and a
prolee's conduct while under supervision is governed by a written agreement. 1 36 The violation of such an agreement can result
in revocation of parole and re-imprisonment. 137 Parole is thought
of as performing a shielding function for society: it is aimed "at
helping the parolee and supervising his adjustment to society
while at the same time protecting society."'13 8 Yet, despite the
fact that Department of Justice statistics indicate that young,
that parole boards did not have authority to fix defendant's minimum period of imprisonment, which exceeded Board's own guideline range).
134 But see Federal Sentencing Guidelines in SENTENCING REFORM 1987, at 513, 534
(PLI Litigation & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. c4-4181, 1987). It has
been asserted that:
In a guidelines sentencing system, no useful purpose will be served by continuing the
Commission. Prison sentences imposed will represent the actual time to be served
and the prisoners and the public will know when offenders will be released from
prison. Prisoners' morale will probably improve when the uncertainties about release
dates are removed. Public respect for the law will grow when the public knows that
the judicially-imposed sentence announced in a particular case represents the real
sentence, rather than one subject to constant adjustment by the Parole Commission.
Id. at 534.
135 See Pamela L. Griset, Discretion, Disparity, and Discrimination in Sentencing:
Where Have All the Critics Gone?, 35 NO. 3 JUDGE'S J. 3, at 4-5 (1996) (explaining tersely
gubenatorial calls for legislative parole reform).
136 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 410.10(1) (stating that defendant must be given written
copy of conditions when imposed).
137 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 410.10(2). This section establishes that:
[A] commission of additional offense.., after imposition of sentence of probation or
of conditional discharge and prior to expiration or termination of... sentence, constitutes a ground for revocation of such sentence, irrespective of whether such fact is
specified as a condition of the sentence.
Id.
138 See William Parker, Parole, Origins, Development, Current Practices and Statutes, American Correctional Association, Parole Corrections Project Resource Document,
no. 1, at 26 (College Park, Maryland, 1975); see also INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. 11, p. 518 (McMillian 1968).
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long-termers (those serving lengthy minimum terms) who educate themselves in prison are less likely to become repeat offenders, the Board is simply not paroling them. The Board can never
square its failure to apply the guideline time range to minimum
13 9
sentences which, in large measure, surpass them.
With the current pace of parole denials quickening, and the total number of convicted offenders entering the prison system today on the rise, 14 0 parole is used perversely to exacerbate the
overcrowding of prisons. 14 1 This results in unnecessary construction and expansion of the prison industrial complex, with no appreciable gains to the taxpayers or the criminal justice system. 14 2 The current controversy over parole continues to be a
politically motivated and distracting sideshow from the war
against violent crime. 14 3 In the meantime, the New York State

139 But see John N. Kane, Jr., DispositionalAuthority and Decision-Making in New
York's Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 954 (1994).
Kane poses the question: "In light of the high recidivism rates of juveniles who leave
these facilities [training schools], we must ask if we are currently making prudent use of
taxpayer dollars. Indeed, institutionalism has not worked." Id. at 955.
140 According to the Correctional Association of New York, as of January, 1998 the
prison population stands at 69,561.
141 See Michele Deitch, In the U.S. Supreme Court: ParoleBy Any Other Name May
Smell as Sweet But Does it Create a Liberty Interest Subject to Due Process Protection?,
available in 12/6/96 WLN 13045 (1996). It is argued that "[w]hile eliminating or limiting
parole may be politically popular, these approaches have simply exacerbated overcrowding problems and increased the frustrations of prison officials who need to make space in
their prisons for the ever-increasing number of admissions." Id; see also Ira P. Robbins,
George Bush's America Melts Dante's Inferno: The Americans with Disabilities Act in
Prisons, 15 YALE L. & POLY REV. 49, 49 (1996). The number of people incarcerated in

state and federal prisons annually has grown at a rate of 8.4% in recent years. Id. at 44.
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Executive
Summary; Correction Populations in the U.S., 1993 (last modified Oct. 1995)
<<http://www.ojp.gov/pub/bjs/ascii/cupus.93ex.txts>> (providing data on prison populations); Pierre Thomas, U.S. Prison Population Continuing Rapid Growth Since 1980's,
Surpasses 1 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1994, at A3 (describing prison population "continuing a staggering growth").
142 See Roger E. Benson, Letters, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 9, 1998, at A27. The reality is
that limiting or abolishing parole would mean the state would have to build more jail
cells to house criminals for the entire length of their sentences. Id.
143 See Dick Thornburgh, Doing What's Necessary to Fight Crime, 17-Apr. PA. LAW.
12, 14 (1995). Most violent crime in the U.S. is committed by a small segment of the
population, a segment replete with repeat offenders. Id. at 14. The longer violent criminals remain imprisoned, the fewer crimes they will commit. Id.; see also Dennis C. Vacco,
'Smart' Lawyering Takes a Bite Out of Crime, Too, N.Y.L.J. Jan 27, 1998, at S4. Explaining that the tighter grip on parole releases from state prisons sends a strong message to street thugs about our renewed resolve to win the war on crime. Id. See generally
Jim McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutor's Powers; Aggressive Tactics But
Fairness at Issue War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutor's Powers; Aggressive Tactics
But Fairnessat Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al. Describing the deleterious consequences a warring attitude can have on the rights of the prosecuted. Id.
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prison population swells by the thousands every year. 1 44 If the
safety valve of parole is eliminated, the State will be forced to
reevaluate its sentencing policies. In the process, the state will
be confronted with the hard choice of reducing the length of
prison sentences imposed under the Rockefeller drug and other
14 6
laws, 14 5 or building new and expensive prisons.
Many criminal justice experts have called for drastic changes
in the Rockefeller drug laws, 14 7 which have resulted in surging
prison costs and quintupled the number of prison inmates since
their enactment twenty-five years ago. 148 For example, according
to the Correctional Association of New York, between 1981 and
1996, the state prison system grew by as many as 39,651 beds, at
a cost of nearly $4 billion dollars. 14 9 And yet, the option of parole
has not been propitiously utilized to temper the dynamics of
prison expansion, which requires the ever-burgeoning expendi144 See David C. Leven, Curing America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 641, 643 (1993) (describing New York State's escalating prison construction and operating costs).
145 See Paula G. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of AfricanAmerican Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 39-40 (1995)

(discussing Rockefeller drug laws, stringent sentencing required, and impact on various
demographic groups).
146 See Debra Lucas Muscoreil, Costly Drug Laws, BUFFALO NEWS, June 15, 1997, at
H3 (suggesting that "Rockefeller drug laws are stuffing our prisons" and that "prison expansion cannot be answer to overcrowding" [particularly] "when thousands of offenders
are incarcerated for possessing small amounts of drugs").
147 See Raymond Hernandez, Governor Commutes Sentence of 3 Convicted on Drug
Charges, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Dec. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 17837367. It was
reported that:
Governor George Pataki, who has joined a generation of lawmakers in expressing
grave reservations about N.Y.'s severe penalties for low level drug offenses, granted
clemency U to three people sentenced to long prison terms under drug laws enacted
under another Republican Governor, Nelson A Rockefeller.
Id.; see also Spiros A. Tsimbinos, After Jenna's Law, Is it Time to Modify the Rockefeller
Drug Laws?, 1998 No. 31 N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS 8 (naming reform advocates); End Parole?,
Other States Tried and Resumed It, NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 1999, at A28 (calling for repeal of
Rockefeller-era drug laws and their draconian sentences).
148 Human Rights Watch conducted a study that found the Rockefeller drug laws
violate international human rights laws and recommended immediate action to arrange
the sentencing policies mandated by the Rockefeller laws.
149 See Marc Maur, Americans Behind Bars: One Year Later, SENTENCING PROJECT
1992 (cited in Alan B. Fischler, The Incarcerationof America, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1992, at
2). It was reported that:
From 1980 to 1988 the combined federal and state inmate populations increased by
90%. New York State has seen its own inmate population almost triple during the
period from 1981 through 1991, rising from 21626 inmates held in state facilities in
1981, to 58,404 held by the end of 1991, an increase of over 270%. Additionally it is
estimated by federal and state correction officials that by 1995, prison populations
will have increased another 30%.
Id.
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ture of tens-of-millions of dollars in additional annual funding.
It is hardly disputable that such funding would be better spent
on education and prevention programs, drug treatment centers,
the development of early release programs and social service
programs in the main.

Governor Pataki's recently published prison plan calls for a
major expansion of the state prison system, requiring $635 million tax dollars to build an additional 3,500 maximum-security
prison cells. 150 The Legislature and Assembly reached a compromise and allocated almost half of those funds needed for half
the number of prison cells requested, the other monies going to
various social service programs. 15 1 Yet, the Board and the Division of Parole continually exclude classes of otherwise eligible offenders from parole release. It follows then, that any impasse on
the expansion of prison building becomes all the more critical today.
Moreover, participation in any rehabilitative programs while
in custody currently does not guarantee discretionary parole release at all. 152 This policy of the Board fails to serve the general
public interest. The Board's primary concentration on the "seriousness of the instant offense" clearly disregards the legislative
intent that the Board of Parole must exercise its discretionary
release authority as required by statute. 153 In this regard, the
150 See Matthew Goldstein, City Bar Opposes Pataki Bills On Crime, N.Y.L.J., July 2,
1997, at 1 (asserting that Governor Pataki has proposed spending $635 million on new
prisons this year); see also Don't Waste States' Money on Building Prisons, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, July 7, 1997, at A38 (noting that "Pataki's prison-building binge would cost
$635 million").
151 See Invest in Education Instead of New Prisons, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 6, 1998, at
C3.Noting that:
The 2,300 new prison cells that Governor Pataki pushed for and got from the state
legislature last year will cost around $200 million just in construction costs, not to
mention the huge costs for hiring more guards and operating the prisons.
Id.
152 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (listing several factors
to be considered in determining parole). See generally Barbara Belbot, Where Can a Prisoner Find a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of Imprisonment Escalate, 42 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1998) (explaining prisoners may be denied visitation in direct contravention of rehabilitation programs).
153 See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-I (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (delineating discretionary authority of Board of Parole); see also Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion?A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 987, 1011 (1995) (emphasizing focus on degree of severity of crime); Cheryl G.
Bader & David S. Douglas, Where to Draw the Guideline: Factoringthe Fruits of Illegal
Searches Into Sentencing Guideline Calculations, 7 TOURO L. REV. 1, 20 (1990) (arguing
broad discretion in Board of Parole).
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Board has egregiously abdicated from its legal mandate. The
Board's failure to fully consider an applicant for parole release,
by confining its inquiry solely to the "instant offense," inappropriately disregards, by "administrative fiat," the duties of the
Board as defined in Executive Law §259-a. 15 4 In the meantime,
the Legislature and the judiciary sit idly by and watch thousands
of men and women "held" unnecessarily every year, and in some
cases, illegally, beyond the minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the judge who presided over the trial or plea. 155
THE PAROLE BOARD NEEDS JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The criminal defense bar needs to be aware that the Division
and Board of Parole are permitted to disregard the Legislative
intent of §259-i of the Executive Law by denying release to eligible offenders. 1 56 This "unwritten policy" is, in effect, implemented without guidance from the Legislature and in the absence of any legislative amendments or changes in the current
parole law. Further, public officials such as the governor of the
state1 57 and mayor of the City of New York, 15 8 are readily poised
to exclude parole for all first-time violent felony offenders with
154 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW. § 259-a (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (outlining responsibilities of Board of Parole); see also People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 248, 252 (1996) (explaining
role of parole board regarding release). See generally John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York's "Interests of Justice "Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 191
(1994) (highlighting instances of differentially applied judicial discretion).
155 But see Douglas A. Wickham, Parole, 74 GEO. L.J. 897, 903 (1986) (discussing
where judiciary takes active role and approves terms which are outside guidelines and
beyond minimum term).
156 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (McKinney 1998).
157 See Tracey Tully, Albany Killing Drives Bid to Curb Parole,TIMES UNION (Alb.),
Jan 11, 1998, at Al. Governor Pataki pushed to eliminate parole for all violent offenders,
and proposed other changes to the criminal justice system such as requiring first time
felony offenders convicted of violent crimes to spend 85% of their sentence in prison, but
establishing a "merit time" proposal for non-violent felons. Id. The last alternative would
allow the latter to qualify for early parole if they earn a high school equivalency diploma,
a vocational certificate, a drug-treatment certificate, or perform 400 hours of supervised
community service. Id. Furthermore, it was proposed that violent juvenile offenders be
transferred from the state youth system to the adult prison system once they attain age
16. Id. The N.Y. legislature has rejected these proposals in the past. Id.
158 See Richard Perez-Pefia, Pataki's Plan to End Parole is Tougher than other
State'sMoves, N.Y. TIMES ABS., Jan. 26, 1998, at 1. In New York, the Governor and the
New York City Mayor want to terminate parole for violent crimes without "adjusting
sentences." Id. In 1998, the New York State Legislature passed Jenna's Law. Effective
as of October 1, 1998, there is no longer discretionary release available in New York for
first time violent offenders. Id. see also Gary Spencer, Assembly Adopts Curbs on Parole,
N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1998, at 1 (noting passage of Governor Pataki's bill eliminating discretionary parole for all first-time violent felons).
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no public referendum or input from the Legislature, Judiciary or
criminal defense bar.159 It is no wonder, that as a result, parole
cases today continue to engender confusion in the sphere of
criminal justice. 16 0
This confusion is caused, in large part, because, upon judicial
review, most judges simply decline to enforce the validity of the
Executive Law sections defining an "abuse of discretion,"'1 6 1 and
thereby refuse to strike down a decision to deny parole which is
clearly an abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious. In many
instances, decisions to deny parole cannot logically be reconciled
with the facts of a particular case. Most often, the Board simply
recites the language of the statute as the predicate for denial.
Upon judicial review in an Article 78 proceeding, 16 2 the refusal
of the judiciary to enforce the law requiring that the Board exercise its appropriate discretion amounts to the unethical abdication of a judicial duty. 163 This is probably due to the unique nature of parole, insofar as the Legislature has passed along the
task of reviewing the merits of arguments raised on the appeal of
the denial of parole release to an administrative agency, 16 4
159 See Craig Gordon, Deadline Looms for Prison Grant/ParoleIssue is a Sticking
Point, NEWSDAY, June 27, 1997, at A61 (explaining insistence by Governor Pataki on
eliminating parole for first-time offenders in exchange for $24 million prison grant); see
also Parole Law Debate State Budget Talks, N.Y.TIMEs ABS., July 1, 1997, at B4 (highlighting budgetary debate which included argument over parole for violent offenders).
See generally Ariane M. Schreiber, States That Kill: Discretionand the Death Penalty - A
Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263, 327 (1996) (discussing circumstance in
which Governor Pataki removed prosecution who disagreed as to sentencing ideologies).
160 See Sarah Metzgar & John Caher, Silver Rejects Pataki Crime Bill, ALBANY
TIMES UNION, July 1, 1997, at Al (discussing confusion arising from minimum maximum sentencing and release dates); see also Jim O'Hara, Web Sites Lists Release Dates of
Violent Felons Some Officials Caution Against Overreaction by the Public, SYRACUSE
POST-STANDARD, Nov. 28, 1997, at B1 (explaining release date website and developing
confusion as to meaning of terms). See generally Probation is Not Parole, BUFFALO NEWS,
Jan. 20, 1997, at B3 (discussing public's confusion over parole and related terms).
161 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (explaining abuse of discretion); see also John F.
Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York's "Interestsof Justice" Dismissal Statute, 58
ALB. L. REV. 175, 177 (1994) (emphasizing implications of "abuse of discretion standard"
as applied).
162 See N.Y. CPLR Article 78 (McKinney 1998). See generally Due Process, 11 TOURO
L. REV. 799, 831 (1995) (highlighting article 78 proceeding and standard enlisted by
Court).
163 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 309, 373 n.158 (1993) (explaining judicial duty to place check on administrative agencies such as Board of Parole);
Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue ProcessRights of Prisonersand
Other Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 549 (1984) (emphasizing danger of
overbroad judicial discretion).
164 See N.Y. ADC T.9, sub. CC, Pt. 8006.
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through the Appeals Unit of the Division of Parole. 1 6 5 Reviewing
courts rarely second-guess the Appeals Unit of the Division, as
long as it renders a finding that the Board reviewed all "relevant
factors."
The Appeals Unit itself was a product of the administration of
Edward R. Hammock as Chair of the Board of Parole. 16 6 The
Unit was not created to be a substitute for the discretion of the
Board. The intent of the appeals process was to ensure that
every inmate who received an unfavorable decision from the
Board would also receive a complete review of that decision if he
wished it.167 Thus, the Appeals Unit was constructed to provide
a fresh look at the case. Review by the Appeals Unit was intended to assur the discovery of mistakes in fact or law. The review of the discretionary determination to deny release to an inmate was left to the Board. 168 The appeals process requires that
three commissioners of the Board of Parole, none of whom may
have participated in the decision from which an inmate is appealing conduct the review of the release panel's exercise of discretion. 16 9 The appellate panel may vote to affirm, modify, or reverse the Board's decision, and the appeal itself is determined by
a majority vote of the panel. 170 Appeals may be made on numerous grounds, the most successful often being the claim that the
Board used inaccurate or incomplete information, citing of errors
made in the scoring of elements in the parole report, or that the
Board's decision otherwise demonstrated prejudice or predetermination. 17 1 There is almost no chance of success in the general
claim that the Board of Parole "abused" its discretion.
To illustrate this seeming "policing" of the policies of the Board
by the Division of Parole Appeals Unit, it should first be noted
that reviewing courts prefer the Board to handle its own af165 See id. (explaining duties of appeals unit).
166 Edward R. Hammock was Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole from
1976 to 1984; the Appeals Unit Sections were filed in 1978.
167 See, e.g. Sentencing Reform Act of 1995, 1995 Sess. Law. News of N.Y. Ch. 3
(5281 A. 7991) (1995) (establishing right of review by Court of denial of inmate's parole).
168 See Branch v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D. Conn. 1979). The district court
held that there was no constitutional infirmity in the law's failure to require Parole
Board to speed procedure and parole interview process. Id.
169 See 9 NYCRR § 8006.4[d] (1998).
170 See 9 NYCRR § 8006.4[e] (1998); see also Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 734, 734
(4th Dep't 1983) (evaluating Board of Parole's decision to deny release).
171 See 2 N.Y.JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 99.5, 63-71 (1979) (explaining role of
administrative agency).
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fairs. 17 2 In doing so, however, the Appeals Unit, on the rare occasion that it actually reverses a defective parole decision (and
the even rarer case that a reviewing court does), merely orders a
re-hearing-where the same defective decision is, more often
than not, reinstated in synonymous terms. A subsequent appeal
attacking the second, equally flawed decision only serves to send
the potential parolee through the procedure yet again. This scenario not only results in a complete waste of scarce judicial and
administrative resources, but, more seriously, in the total deprivation of the right to a fair hearing which, if provided in the first
17 3
place, would likely result in parole release.
ABOLITION OR CURING: A REFORMATION OF PAROLE IS NEEDED

The increase in judicial deference to the discretion of the
Board and Division of Parole has never been more apparent than
it is today. However, as this article has discussed, this broad
discretion has not been matched by improved management of the
parole process. It may be argued that, with the increased need
for scarce jail cells, the parole process should be used in a more
effective and fairer way, that protects public safety with a balanced and serious approach that adheres to the legislative intent
set forth in the Executive Law. 17 4 This clearly has not been the
case. The Board itself arguably should be the first to recognize
that New Yorkers demand, and are entitled to, an efficient and
professional parole process in a system that accommodates ethnic minorities and the poor, who constitute the majority of men
17 5
and women in the prison system today.
The authority to establish penal policy lies exclusively with the
state Legislature. Yet, the current practice of imposing a two172 See, e.g., Robert Eldgridge Underhill, Sentence Entrapment: A Casualty of the
War on Crime, 1994 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 165, 165 (1994) (describing decline in exercise of
judicial review of parole decisions).
173 See Matter of Quartararo, 637 N.Y.S.2d 721, 721 (1st Dep't 1996) (then-justice
Kristin Booth Glenn articulating this sentiment in meticulously crafted opinion).

174 See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 259-a (McKinney 1998) (emphasizing importance of administrative discretion.)
175 See Jason A. Gillmer, U.S. v. Clary: Equal Protectionand the Crack Statute, 45
AM. U.L. REV. 497, 565 n. 494 (1995) (evidencing disproportionately large numbers of
minorities in correctional system); Michael Welch, Rehabilitation:Holding its Ground in
Corrections,59 FED. PROBATION 3, 6 (1995) (quoting Robert Gangi, Executive Director of
Correctional Association of New York, as saying, "Prisons are becoming the place where
we provide services to our poor people").
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year "hold" in most cases appearing before Board panels amply
demonstrates the Board's fundamental misunderstanding of the
limitations on its administrative power. 1 76 The difficulty involved in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular
offender is entrusted, by statute, to the deliberative power of the
sentencing court, not the Board. 17 7 The original legislation placing the Board and the Division of Parole under the executive
branch of the state government had the specific purpose of establishing an orderly and independent agency, which would serve
the purpose of establishing a more structured framework within
which to set minimum terms of imprisonment and make release
decisions. 17 8 Subsequently, the responsibility of setting minimum terms was removed from the purview of the Board of Pa79
role, and placed entirely in the hands of sentencing judges. 1
However, over a twenty-year period, unrestricted by either judicial oversight or proper supervision, the Board of Parole has
apparently disregarded this legislative change, operating under
the false assumption that it still possesses jurisdiction to set
what it deems are appropriate minimum terms. 18 0 The net result
of the Board's refusal to exercise appropriate discretion serves to
override the minimum term of imprisonment set by the sentencing judge. This is an apparently ironic result, because the
leaders of the Governor's political party have long accused
Democratic party leaders of manipulating the judiciary when it
could not pass its goals through the Legislature. 18 1 Here, parole
release denial accomplishes what the Governor cannot do via the
176 See Cavender & Musheno, supra note 14, at 452 (emphasizing new restraints by
courts enacted against abuses of discretion or parole boards).
177 See Palacios, supra note 11, at 571. "Given the number of parole decisions made
in some jurisdictions by varying panels of members, it would seem serendipitous, if when
compared, those decisions were proportionate, equitable, uniform or predictable." Id.
178 See L. 1977, c. 904, Exec. Mem., L.1977 904. See generally James R. Acker, When
the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 PACE L. REV. 41, 127 (1996) (discussing court's establishment of appropriate sen-

tence).
179 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.00; L.1978, c. 481; L. 1979, c. 410 (McKinney 1998)
(empowering court to set minimum term).
180 See, e.g., Acker, supra, note 178, at 128 (describing sentencing as occurring subsequent to trial); Theodore Elsenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1993) (emphasizing that jurors
have no knowledge of minimum terms which may be later established by Board of Parole).
181 See, e.g., John Caher, Rhetoric and Reality in Pataki Era, ALBANY TIMES-UNION,
Jan. 18, 1998, at A6 (highlighting debates between Democrats and Republicans including
deemed legislative measure and subsequent retaliation).
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Legislature: Simply by failing to exercise their discretion during
the parole hearing, the Board members carry a clear message
from Albany that no convicted violent felon should be released to
parole. Today, by denying release to parole supervision, it is the
Board of Parole, which, in effect, still sets the minimum terms
according to what it deems appropriate, despite the fact that
82
similar offenders are not treated similarly. 1
When then-Governor Hugh L. Carey signed the 1977 Legislation enacting changes into the parole system 18 3 by making it a
branch of the Executive Department, he had no way of foreseeing
that a successor could induce the Board to act as a political functionary and extend a political agenda. 184 Clearly, such is the case
today. In the cases of entire classes of offenders (e.g., sex offenders and violent felony offenders), the Board appears to have
abandoned the exercise of its discretionary release powers within
the parameters of the court's sentences. This de facto sentencing
power of the Board and Division of Parole belongs out of the
85
hands of the political process. As stated in Matter of King,1 : "It
is the province of the legislative process, except insofar as the
legislature has entrusted, within certain parameters, the imposition of individual sentences to the judiciary."'18 6 Accordingly, the
Board of Parole should concentrate on doing the work that defines its administrative mission, pursuant to the mandates of
Executive Law §259-i(2).187
Both the New York State Association of Criminal Defense
182 See Joseph T. Hallinan, Although Outlawed, Parole is a Persistent Problem,
TIMES PICAYNE, June 23, 1986, at A12 (analogizing parole boards to "toll booth attendants").
183 See Griset, supra note 22, at 576 (examining Governor Carey's initiative in creating parole Reform Act of 1977); see also Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 576 (1994) (highlighting fact that parole boards make decisions based on "imprecise standards").
184 See Julio A. Thompson, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial
Immunity to Parole Board Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICH. L. REV.
241, 251 (1988) (noting political agendas of Parole Boards in N.Y.).
185 See Matter of Darryl King v. New York State Division of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d,
245 (1993).

186 Matter of King, 190 A.D.2d 423, 432 (1993). See, e.g., Executive Advisory Committee on Sentencing Crime and Punishment in New York: An Inquiry Into Sentencing and
the Criminal Justice System 10-15, 51-64 (1979) (discussing fact that in New York, parole
boards essentially re-sentence offenders).
187 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999) (referring to guidelines); see also Edward R. Hammock, Preliminaryand Post Conviction ConsiderationsIn
Criminal Cases, in HOW TO HANDLE YOUR FIRST CRIMINAL TRIAL (PLI Litigation & Administrative Practice Course Handbook series No. 64-4217 at 176, 1997) (looking at
mandates of Executive Law § 259).
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Lawyers' Committee on Corrections and the Court of Appeals
propound that the role of the Board of Parole is not to simply resentence an inmate according to the personal opinions and political beliefs of its members, but to determine whether, based
upon the statutory criteria set forth by the Legislature in the Executive Law, an eligible inmate should be released to community
supervision.18 8 This position lends strong support to the argument that the practical and legal aspects of parole release are
manifestations of public policy concerns, and therefore require
open and considered debate. The public in general, and the
criminal defense bar in particular, can and should provide necessary input to those in the Executive Branch who presently oversee the administration of the Board and Division of Parole. By
its current actions, the Division of Parole is hastening its own
demise by using the two-year "hold" too frequently. If the Board
refuses to appropriately apply the discretion it has been given by
statute, the need for the Board is called into question.
REMEDIES TO AVERT THE DEMISE OF THE CURRENT PAROLE
SYSTEM

The Board and Division of Parole need to be reminded that,
unless there is a valid reason to deny release, the proper decision
is to grant parole. 189 So far, the courts have allowed the Board to
deny parole ad hoc, thus producing a governmental agency that
is a virtual renegade among its administrative peers in the
criminal justice system. 19 0 Most importantly, policy makers and
elected officials must make a concerted effort to respond to complaints by the criminal defense bar of predetermined Board decisions, abuse of discretion and racial and political bias, in reaching the decision to deny or grant release to eligible inmates. 19 1
188 See Estella Baker, From "MakingBad People Worse" to "PrisonWorks": Sentencing Policy In England and Wales in the 1990's, 7 CRIM. L.F. 639, 682 (1996) (discussing
community supervision of parolees); Michael M. Pacheco, The Educational Role of the
Board of Parole,58-Dec. FED. PROBATION 38, 38 (1994).
189 See Palacios, supra note 11, at 606 (noting that Board may parole when it deems
it reasonably probable that no detriment will be caused to community).
190 See Harvard Law Review Association, Race and Non-capital Sentencing, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1626, 1628 (1988) (illustrating virtually unlimited discretion of Parole
Boards).
191 See Leon Freidman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in
Section 1983 Actions in 12TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTs LITIGATION, at 91 (PLI
Litig & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1-14-5234 554, 1983) (discussing
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This can be best accomplished by allowing the criminal defense
bar to meaningfully participate in the parole hearing process and
by having an independent commission of the judiciary and the
bar select the members of the Board. 1 9 2 Included in this oversight commission should be not only judges, but also members of
the criminal defense bar, Administrative Law Judges, parole
commissioners and criminal justice specialists who are commit93
ted to fairness and equity in the criminal justice process. 1
The Board's exercise of its discretion should also be subject to
periodic review to ensure its compliance with its statutory mandates. 194 This same commission could be given this important
responsibility because the Board of Parole protects the public by
making good release decisions, not politically expedient ones. 19 5
Although the Board is required to employ the guidelines in structuring its discretion in release decisions, it has abandoned
them. 19 6 As a direct consequence, there is no predictability regarding the Board's exercise of its release powers. Much the
same as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1987,197 the
pragmatic use of the parole guidelines would structure the
Board's discretion and thereby ensure compliance with the Executive Law. 19 8 The Board would then have the duty to rebut the
presumption that an otherwise eligible inmate is not suitable for
parole. This would also serve to require that similarly situated
offenders be treated similarly, and relieve the inequities that
certain studies have indicated exist with respect to sentencing
disparity throughout the state. 19 9 Changes in the way this state
different aspects boards must consider in making parole decisions); see also Eric Mayer,
Procedures for Granting and Revoking Parole, 83 N.Y. JUR Penal Inst. § 216 (stating
boards must inform inmates of reasons and factors for denial of parole).
192 See Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part 1 (1910-1972)
61-SEP. FED. PROBATION 23, 23 (1997) (discussing membership of federal parole boards).
193 See id.
194 See id.; see also Briqugulio v. New York State Board of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 23
(1969) (stating that release on parole is entirely up to discretion of parole board).
195 See Deborah A. Blom, Parole, 71 GEO. L.J. 705, 705 (1982) (stating that parole
boards are designed to protect public welfare).
196 See Palacios, supra note 11, at 567 (providing general overview of parole release
guidelines and possible effects they may have on system).
197 See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1BI et. seq. (as amended 1998).
198 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §2 59 (McKinney 1998).
199 See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Parole
Board Party, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161 (1991) (describing disparate results under federal
sentencing guidelines); Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory
Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the
Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 389, 489 (1996) (discussing sen-
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handles its parole process should also take into account whether
an inmate complies with the statutory requirements of the Executive Law; then there should be a presumption that he or she
.20 0
will be paroled
CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that the Governor has continually called for
the elimination of parole for violent offenders convicted for a second time, 20 1 reformation of the Board of Parole would effectively
codify and improve parole procedures-which, in turn, would
improve the safety of the public. The concomitant result would
also measurably improve the performance of the parole system
in all aspects, without unnecessarily compromising the rights of
those otherwise eligible for parole release consideration. In this
regard, the Governor's politically motivated battle cry calling for
the elimination of parole in many cases would be further undermined and rendered moot. But more importantly, the implementation of these reforms would thereby have a direct impact on
the administration of justice in this state and serve as an exemplary model of progressive reform well into the next century.

tencing guidelines and similarly situated offenders).
200 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (detailing requirements for parole eligibility); see also
Exec. Memoranda L.1977, C.904, pp. 2538.
201 See D. Michael Fisher, Changing PA's Sentencing Philosophy through the Elimination of Parole for Urgent Offenders, 5 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 269, 294 (1996) (suggesting
elimination of parole for violent high risk offenders); Alison Virag Griessman, The Fateof
"MegansLaw" in New York, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 181, 191 (1996) (discussing limitations
on parole for sex offenders).

